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ABSTRACT 
 
Experimental economics focuses on eliciting preferences, studying individuals one at a 
time to take into account their heterogeneity. Experiments have the appealing property 
of collecting enough observations to perform such an analysis. In real word, and in 
natural experiments, individuals cannot be observed according to experimenters’ needs. 
We propose a method that aggregates over individuals taking into account their 
heterogeneity. Using data from a natural experiment, we estimate three models of 
decision making under risk: Expected Utility, Rank-Dependent Expected Utility and 
Regret-Rejoice. Our results show that individual-wise analyses can be substituted by 
pooled approaches without losing information about individual heterogeneity. 
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RISK ATTITUDE IN REAL DECISION PROBLEMS 
 
 
This paper aims at providing new evidence on risk aversion, focussing on aggregation 
over individuals eliciting their heterogeneity. The relevance of this topic is twofold: 
from a theoretical point of view, by showing that differences among people significantly 
affect their decisions, we highlight the need for theoretical developments which can 
better account for diversity. From an applied viewpoint, the statistical significance of 
such individual factors allows for better estimates than the ones one obtains when 
disregarding this issue. 
In lab experiments, individuals are observed as many times as the experimenter needs. 
This has provided ground for a flourishing literature focussing on the analysis of choice 
rules estimated individual by individual. Such a kind of approach is nearly unfeasible 
when data stemming from natural experiments are used. However, natural experiments’ 
datasets are very attractive for they have the benefit of salient incentives. Therefore, in 
order to study choice rules when the number of observations on each individual is 
exogenously determined, researchers need to pool individual data. 
Participants both in lab and natural experiments differ in crucial characteristics. In 
pooling their data, we cannot discard this fact. Using data from a natural experiment, 
namely a TV show, which involves players taking decisions between risky prospects 
with outcomes up to half-a- million euros, we estimate three models of decision making 
under risk: Expected Utility, Rank-Dependent Expected Utility and Regret-Rejoice. The 
characteristics of the game, which involves lotteries composed of small and very large 
prizes, allow us to investigate the performance of the Rank-Dependent Expected Utility 
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(RD) and Regret-Rejoice (RR) utility functionals1 in addition to the standard Expected 
Utility (EU) functional.  
Our research is designed to capture nuances in players’ behaviour neglected by the EU 
formulation. Specifically, with the introduction of a RD functional, we can take into 
account the fact that some players appear to overweight the extreme prizes of a lottery 
with respect to the others; while the RR functional allows us to consider players’ 
regretting or rejoicing considerations, when confronted with situations that could 
radically change their lives. 
In order to give the choice models sufficient flexibility to fit the data, we introduce 
heterogeneity both in the form of observable and unobservable individual characteristics. 
The former includes everything concerning agents that can be observed, like gender or 
geographical origin;2 the latter involves all individual characteristics that cannot be 
observed, such as optimism or pessimism, cultural background, etc. In order to include 
unobserved heterogeneity in the choice models, we use econometric tools proper to the 
analysis of panel data and Monte Carlo simulation techniques.  
We find significant roles both for observed and unobserved individual characteristics, 
showing  that our estimates provide a superior fitting of the choice models than other 
studies. We also find that Regret-Rejoice does not significantly improve upon Expected 
Utility, while Rank-Dependent outperforms it. Interestingly, we find that the CARA 
specification fits significantly better than the conventionally-adopted CRRA 
specification. From our results we infer that individual-wise analyses can be 
satisfactorily substituted for by a pooled approach, without losing information on 
individual heterogeneity. 
                                                 
1 Loomes and Sugden (1983); Quiggin (1993). 
2 Harrison and Rutström (2005). 
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The paper is structured as follows. In section 1, the basic rules of the game are presented; 
section 2 highlights the econometric models to be estimated; in section 3 the empirical 
results are presented. Section 4 concludes. Additional results are reported in appendix. 
 
 
1. The game and the sample 
  
Television shows provide a good natural context in which ordinary people face well-
defined decision problems in a ceteris paribus environment, and in which players have 
the benefit of salient incentives. Studies using such data are able to overcome both the 
Harrison and List (2004) and the Rabin (2000) critiques to experimental methods in 
economics, concerning the inferential validity of estimates based on the typical 
economic experiment, i.e. based on a non-representative sample and limited incentives 
provided by small money stakes. 
Friend and Blume (1975), Gertner (1993), Metrick (1995) and Beetsma and Shotman 
(2001) measure individual risk attitude through television games in the US: Gertner 
(1993) and Friend and Blume (1975) obtain relatively high coefficients of risk aversion 
in data from the game Card Sharks and Beetsma and Shotman (2001) using data from 
the TV show Lingo; instead Metrick (1995) finds risk neutrality using data from the 
game Jeopardy! 
We use data from the TV-show Affari tuoi, the Italian edition of the popular 
international format Deal or no Deal. The Italian game exhibits some relevant 
variations from the main international format. Specifically, it is developed as a 5-step 
stop-and-go game between a player and a Banker. The game starts with 20 players, one 
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from each of the 20 Italian regions. They are randomly assigned 20 sealed boxes, each 
containing a prize drawn from a known distribution (see Table 1). Boxes’ contents 
range from € 0.01 to € 500,000: the average prize is € 52,545.83, with a very high 
standard deviation (€ 117,639.07) and a highly skewed distribution.  
 
 
TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
 
One player is selected to actually play the game by means of a quick question: the 
fastest candidate who answers correctly plays the game.3  The game then proceeds as 
follows. In each of the 5 rounds, the player opens a fixed number of boxes (6 in the first 
round, 3 in the following), losing the possibility of winning the prizes contained therein. 
Between every two rounds, the Banker makes an offer: he either offers the player the 
opportunity to change her box with any of the remaining ones (“swap”), or he can offer 
a certain amount of money to the player to quit the game. If the player accepts the 
money, the game ends; otherwise she proceeds to the next round. If the player gets to 
the final round without having accepted any of the Banker’s money offers, she wins the 
content of the box owned at that stage.  
As Andersen et al. (2006a, 2006b, 2006c) notice, three main estimation strategies have 
been developed to test hypotheses on behaviour under risk within Deal or No Deal. We 
briefly discuss them here.  
                                                 
3
 The questions are usually so naïve (e.g. the number of time the word “amore” appears in Dante's Divina Commedia) 
that no one can possibly answer but by chance. Hence, we will assume that players are randomly selected, though 
with a presumption of self-selection of the original 20 candidates of individuals keen of appearing on TV. 
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The most simple method is to develop qualitative indicators which usually lead to 
scarce but definitive conclusions: for example, by comparing the money offer with the 
expected value of two remaining prizes at the last game round, risk-loving, indifference 
to risk, or risk-aversion can be easily inferred. Many authors make this kind of analysis 
as a preliminary step to more structured estimations, and Blvatskyy and Pogrebna 
(2006a and 2006b) use qualitative indicators to formally test alternative hypotheses 
about players’ risk attitude. Such an analysis allows conducting individual-specific 
estimates, but its applicability is limited to a small set of research questions.  
Alternatively, a bound approach is used. It is meant to provide upper and lower bounds 
for the risk attitude parameter according to players’ behaviour during the game. The 
typical application assumes expected utility behaviour (EU), with CARA or CRRA 
preference functionals, implying that the highest offer rejected sets a maximum value 
for individual's risk aversion, while the offer possibly accepted sets a minimum value. 
The main advantage of this technique is that it also allows for individual-specific 
estimates, at the cost of providing only intervals of values, frequently not closed (for 
individuals who never accept the Banker's offers) and possibly empty (for individuals 
not behaving consistently to the simple choice model adopted). Henceforth, this method 
is employed in several works as a preliminary data analysis (exception being Deck et al. 
(2006) and Post et al. (2006)). Bombardini and Trebbi (2005) extend this analysis to an 
interval regression of the estimated bounds, in order to investigate the role of possible 
sources of observed heterogeneity among contestants. 
Finally, it is possible to define a latent structural decision process and estimate a logit or 
probit model as a function of the model's parameters. This is the approach we follow as 
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well as  Andersen et al. (2006a, 2006b, 2006c), Mulino et al. (2006), Post et al. (2007), 
Sarafidis and de Roos (2006). 
We analyse players' answers and consider only the instances when the Banker makes a 
monetary offer, because the models of behaviour we consider would predict perfect 
indifference over changing box.4  
We represent players' decisions as a choice between the Banker’s offer and a lottery 
which consists in the possibility of winning any of the remaining prizes with equal 
probability. In other words, we assume that contestants behave myopically, in they 
consider the possibility of winning one of the remaining prizes in a subsequent round of 
the game, but they neglect the future Banker’s offers (or, which is the same, they 
assume that future offers will equal the expected value of the remaining prizes). It is 
worth noting that no clear consensus has been reached thus far about the validity of 
alternative hypotheses on players' myopia or on different degrees of forward-looking 
behaviour in the game. Several attempts have been made employing bound approaches, 
but these do not allow for a formal comparison of estimates, e.g. through some 
measures of goodness-of-fit. Sarafidis and de Roos (2006) propose the only attempt of 
fitting a structural model of both dynamic and static behaviours, using a database from 
the Australian edition of Deal or no Deal. Unfortunately, their estimates are based on 
samples of different length, and therefore the likelihood of the two models are non-
comparable. Our sample is composed by 298 showings: although players are randomly 
selected, we observe men and women in a perfect one-half of the showings. Players are 
less evenly divided on geographical origin basis: in our sample we record 115 players 
from the North of Italy (39% of the whole sample, 62 men and 53 women), 75 from the 
                                                 
4 Blvatskyy and Pogrebna (2006a and 2006b) consider choices over the swap, on a subset of the Italian database. 
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Centre (25%, 36 and 39), and 108 from the South (36%, 51 and 57). All regions are 
represented, ranging from 7 players from Calabria to 22 from Veneto.  
Table 2 reports some summary statistics of the main characteristics of the sample. 
 
 
TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
 
 
 
2. The choice models 
 
We assume that during the game players are confronted with a sequence of binary 
choices between a lottery, where they can win one of the remaining boxes, each 
obviously with equal probability, and a degenerate lottery where they can win with 
probability 1 the amount of money offered by the Banker.  
The game consists of 5 rounds, which we denote by n. We consider three different 
preference functionals: Expected Utility, Rank-Dependent Expected Utility and Regret-
Rejoice. We assume that player i’s utility function either takes the form of a Constant 
Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) function, given by 
i
i
i R
xRxU )exp()( ⋅−−= , (1) 
or by a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) function,5 defined by 
                                                 
5 The utility functionals are appropriately normalized, such that Ui(0)=0 and Ui(max(x))=1. 
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where x is the outcome and Ri is a risk attitude parameter.  
As noted before, we estimate players’ preferences alternatively assuming EU, RD and 
RR preferences. We start with EU. Specifically, let EUin be the EU of the lottery in 
round n for player i, that is the probability-weighted utility of each outcome left in 
round n, 
∑ ⋅=
nk
nkinkin
xUpEU )( , (3) 
where  is the probability of outcome k in round n. 
nk
p
Let Ui(offn) be the utility of the amount offered to player i in round n by the Banker. 
Then, if player i exhibits EU preferences, he or she chooses the option of playing the 
lottery or the option of accepting the amount offered, according to as  is bigger or 
smaller than 0, where  is defined by  
inU
∗∇
inU
∗∇
inniinin offUEUU ε+−=∇ ∗ )( . (4) 
Here inε  is a Fechner-type error term (Hey and Orme, 1994) that we assume to be 
distributed normal, inε ~ ( )2,0 εσN . It can be interpreted as a computational error 
individuals commit in calculating utilities: the bigger  , the bigger the error. 2εσ
If, instead, the individual’s preference functional is that of RD, then we define RDin to 
be the RD of the lottery in round n for player i, 
∑ ⋅=
n
nnk
kiikin xURD )(π , (5) 
where the prizes  are sorted in decreasing order, with weights 
nk
x
)...()...( )1(11 nkninkninik ppwppw −++−++=π , (6) 
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γi is the RD parameter. Thus, if γi = 1, RD reduces to EU. Table 11 in the appendix 
reports the cumulative weighting functions for rank-dependent preferences (wi(p)) and 
the distributions of weights across prizes in decreasing order at each round (
nik
π ). It is 
worth noting that, when γi<1, the two extreme prizes (the highest and the lowest) are 
over-valued with respect to the central, and this attitude increases as γi goes to zero; 
moreover, the lowest prize gets a higher weight with respect to the highest, even if this 
relative distance reduces as γi goes to 1. When γi>1, the order of importance of the 
prizes is opposite (prizes at the centre of the spectrum are given more weight than those 
at the upper and lower ends), even if the lowest prize is still over-valued relatively to the 
highest at all rounds. 
If player i exhibits RD preferences, he or she chooses the option of playing the lottery or 
the option of accepting the amount offered, according as inU
∗∇  is bigger or smaller than 
0, where 
inniinin offURDU ε+−=∇ ∗ )( . (8) 
Finally, if instead the individual preference functional is that of RR theory and we 
denote RRin as the RR utility of the lottery in round n for player i, relatively to the offer 
offn, 
[ ]
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where ai is the RR parameter. Thus, if ai = 1, also RR reduces to EU. If ai<1, players 
experience regretting behaviours; while, if ai>1, their choices are influenced by 
rejoicing considerations about the lottery and the money offer they are confronted. 
If player i exhibits RR preferences, he or she chooses the option of playing the lottery or 
the option of accepting the amount offered, according as inU
∗∇  is bigger or smaller than 
0, where 
ininin RRU ε3+=∇ ∗ . (10) 
Actually, whatever the preference functional is, we observe the variable ∇Uin = 1 if 
individual i in round n chooses the lottery, and ∇Uin = 0 if individual i in round n 
chooses the offer. The three choice models are then described by: 
1=∇ inU        if        0>∇ ∗inU
0=∇ inU        if       . 0≤∇ ∗inU
(11) 
As each game is composed of several binary choices, for each player we observe a 
sequence of 0’s and 1’s, corresponding to the player’s choices at each stage of the game. 
Then, the likelihood contribution of player i is the joint probability of observing the 
sequence of outcomes (∇Ui1,…,∇UiN), 
),,,,( 1 αiiiNii zXUUfL ∇∇= K , (12) 
where Xi represents the time sequence of lottery prizes in player i’s game and N is the 
round player i leaves the game. 
To handle this joint probability we need to make assumptions on the error term inε  and 
on the independence of observations. In effect, as our sample contains repeated 
observations on the same contestant, we cannot discard the hypothesis that these 
observations are correlated.  In a linear random-effects panel data model, this situation 
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is generally handled by introducing an individual-specific intercept in the model, 
referred to as unobserved heterogeneity, which is assumed to have a particular 
distribution across individuals. What is left of the error term is therefore independent of 
everything else in the model. In contrast, our latent dependent variables are non-linear 
in the parameters to be estimated (eqq. 5, 11 and 15).  In this case, to control for 
individual correlation we assume that there is a systematic individual-specific 
component in the risk aversion parameter, which is normally distributed across the 
population: 
ra
iii uzR +′+= βα . (13) 
Here α is a constant, zi is a vector of observed demographic characteristics, and uira 
reflects unobserved heterogeneity, with uira∼ ( )2,0 εσN , such that Ri∼ ( )2, raizN σβα ′+ . 
When the preference functional is RD, we also assume that the RD parameter is a 
function of demographic variables (zi) and unobserved heterogeneity (uird): 
rd
ii
rd
i uz +′+= ϕγγ , (14) 
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(15) 
Finally, when the considered preference functional is RR, we assume that the RR 
parameter is a function of a constant (α), demographic variables (zi) and unobserved 
heterogeneity (uirr), 
rr
ii
rr
i uza +⋅′+= υγ , (16) 
with  
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(17) 
After controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity, we are now allowed to assume that 
εin are independently and identically distributed and independent of everything else. We 
also allow for the possibility of sub-optimal behaviour, by introducing a tremble 
parameter, ω. It measures the probability that players “tremble” in their choice. The 
tremble ω is zero if players behave optimally; on the contrary, it is 1 if they choose 
completely random.6
We can now write contestant i’s likelihood contribution in the case of EU as 
ra
i
ra
i
ra
iiiin
n
duuguzXUf )(]}
2
),,,()1[({ ωαω +∇−∏∫ ∞+∞− . (18) 
where  is the probability density function of . ( ).g raiu
In the case individual i is a RD expected utility maximiser, her likelihood contribution is: 
rd
i
ra
i
rd
i
ra
i
rd
i
ra
iiiin
n
duduuuhuuzXUf ),(]}
2
),,,,()1[({ ωαω +∇−∏∫∫ ∞+∞−∞+∞− , (19) 
where  is the joint density function of  and . ( ).,.h raiu rdiu
Finally, in the case of RR preferences, it is instead: 
rr
i
ra
i
rr
i
ra
i
rr
i
ra
iiiin
n
duduuuluuzXUf ),(]}
2
),,,,()1[({ ωαω +∇−∏∫∫ ∞+∞−∞+∞− . (20) 
where  denotes the joint density function of  and . ( ).,.l raiu rriu
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 See Moffatt and Peter (2001). 
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3. Main econometric results 
 
The three models presented in the previous paragraph are estimated by maximum 
simulated likelihood. 7  Our sample consists of 298 players, observed 3.1 times on 
average. The distribution of uira and the joint distributions (uira, uird) and (uira, uirr) are 
simulated using 125 draws for each player based on Halton sequences.8 The estimates 
of the three models with both a CARA and a CRRA specification, without demographic 
variables, are reported respectively in tables 3 and 4.9  
 
TABLES 3 AND 4 AROUND HERE 
 
Both tables show that the mean of the risk aversion parameter (α in all the specifications) 
is significantly bigger than 0; the mean of the RD parameter (γrd) is significantly smaller 
than 1; the mean of the RR parameter (γrr) is not significantly different from 1.  
Furthermore, likelihood-ratio (see table 12) and BIC tests (reported at the bottom of 
each estimate) show that the RD specification always fits better than the EU and the RR 
specification, and that the latter never significantly improves the fitting over the EU 
model.10  
Finally, all the tremble parameters are statistically significant and small in magnitude, 
though bigger under the CRRA specification than with a CARA utility functional. 
                                                 
7 Gourieroux and Monfort (1996). 
8 Train (2003). 
9 In fitting the models above, some of the parameters are appropriately constrained, so that: 0>iγ , 
, 0>ia 0,, ≥rrrdra σσσ , 0≥εσ  and 10 ≤≤ω . The standard errors of the transformed parameters 
are evaluated by the delta method (Oehlert, 1992). 
10 However, we should point out that, within the framework of Affari Tuoi, in certain circumstances RR preferences 
are not identifiable over expected utility. This is the case of the 5th round, when players face choices between an 
amount of money and a lottery with only two prizes. 
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3.1 Unobserved Heterogeneity  
 
We notice that unobserved heterogeneity plays a crucial role in the estimates of the risk 
aversion parameter (Ri), the RD parameter (γi), and of the RR parameter (ai), as showed 
by the large magnitude of the estimated standard deviations of uira, uird, and uirr 
relatively to the constant part (respectively, α, γrd and γrr). 
Moreover, there is a strong evidence of correlation between the unobserved 
heterogeneity terms in both the RD and the RR models, since ( )rdrardrardra σσσρ ,, =  
and ( )rrrarrrarrra σσσρ ,, =  are always statistically significant, respectively positive and 
negative in sign. This result allows us to identify a systematic relationship among risk 
aversion, and RD and RR behaviours. In effect, a positive correlation in the RD model 
shows that the more risk averse a player is the bigger the RD parameter, and vice versa. 
This suggests that there is a tendency for the most risk loving players to overvalue the 
extreme prizes of the lottery they are playing with respect to the central; while the most 
risk averse tend to flatten their prizes’ weight distribution. As far as the RR model is 
concerned, a negative correlation showed by the two unobserved heterogeneity terms 
implies that the more a player is risk averse the more she experiences regretting 
behaviours, such that the player tend to accept the offer more often with respect to EU 
players, ceteris paribus. On the contrary, the most risk loving players seem to rejoice 
more, accepting to play the lottery more often than players who have EU preferences, 
ceteris paribus. 
The imposition of a panel data structure to the data through the introduction of the 
unobserved heterogeneity terms always improves the fitting over the models which do 
not use the information on the common origin of groups of observations, hence not 
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allowing for a systematic attitude in each player’s behaviour. This can be clearly seen 
by comparing the estimates in tables 3 and 4 with those in tables 8 and 9 in appendix.  
As the BIC tests in tables 3,4,8 and 9 also show, in all our estimates, the CARA 
specification fits better than the CRRA specification independently of the preference 
functional11. This result is relevant since the majority of the experimental literature 
generally adopts only the CRRA specification. This argument, together with the one 
explained in the previous paragraph, induces us to consider EU and RD preferences 
with a CARA specification only in what follows. 
Following the findings commented in this paragraph, in what follow we will focus on 
EU and RD models with a CARA utility functional.12  
In unreported analysis, we also estimate the CRRA specification of the three models, 
assuming a non-zero life-time wealth as a parameter to be estimated, similarly to 
Andersen et al. (2006).  We find that the long-life wealth parameter is significantly 
different from zero and close to 20,000€.  Nevertheless, the use of these specifications 
never improves the fitting of our data over the CARA.13
 
3.2 Demographics and framing effects 
 
To introduce observed heterogeneity, we include in our estimation a dummy sex and two 
geographical dummies (dummy north and dummy south) 14 . Also an end-of-period 
dummy has been introduced (5th round dummy), which we interpret as a framing effect 
generated in early rounds when players face not a one-shot lottery but a sequence of 
                                                 
11 See table 12 in appendix. 
12 Further results are available from the authors upon request. 
13 These results are available from the authors upon request. 
14 The introduction of demographics has the only effect to compute the mean of the risk aversion and the RD 
parameters for cohorts of players grouped on a gender and geographical basis. 
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nested lotteries. EU and RD estimates including demographics and the 5th round dummy 
are reported in tables 5 and 6 respectively.  
In the EU model, specifications 2 and 3 listed in table 5, players gender does not 
significantly affect their risk aversion;15 by contrary, the significance of the parameter 
on the dummy north reveals players from the Centre and South of Italy to be relatively 
less risk averse than the others. Indeed, the fitting significantly improves over the 
estimate in table 3 (EU) only when the 5th round dummy is introduced, according to the 
likelihood-ratio tests. The statistical significance of this framing effect suggests that 
players are much more risk averse when confronted with a one-shot lottery, even if in 
those cases the tremble’s magnitude increases. 
With RD preferences, the parameters on the 5th round dummy, both affecting players’ 
risk aversion and RD attitudes, are never significant (table 6, specifications 1 and 3) in 
that they never improve the fitting. By contrary, the introduction of demographics 
definitely improves the fitting of the RD model, according to the likelihood-ratio test 
(see table 12 in appendix). 
Concerning the estimates of the risk aversion parameter in the RD model with 
demographics (table 6, specifications 2 and 3), we observe that the mean of the risk 
aversion parameter for players from the North and from the South of Italy is slightly 
bigger than that of the others and that gender does not seem to have any influence on 
their risk attitude. Moreover, according to the Wald tests: the mean of the RD parameter 
for players from the South and North of Italy is slightly significantly smaller than 1, 
whatever their gender is; 16  indeed, the sum of the coefficients on γrd, sexrd and 
                                                 
15 See Schubert et al. (1999) 
16 H0: γrd + dummy northrd = 1 v/s H1: γrd + dummy northrd < 1; table 6 (2), = 4.91534 (p-value = 0,0856); table 6 
(3), 
2
2χ
2
2χ  = 5,09032 (p-value = 0.0785). 
 17
alternatively on dummy northrd and dummy southrd is significantly smaller than 1, with a 
value close to 0.54, that is smaller than the mean RD parameter estimated without 
demographics in table 4 (that is significantly smaller than 1 and close to 0.76).17
 
3.3 Self-selection 
At the beginning, we decided to introduce a 4th and a 5th round dummy among the 
explicative variables of risk aversion and RD parameters, to check for the presence of 
self-selectivity (attrition) in the sample; that is more risk averse players accept the offer 
at early rounds, quitting the game, and can no longer be observed.18 In the EU model, 
these two dummies are, counter-intuitively, statistically significant and positive 
(showing that players become more risk averse as the game progresses) and never 
significant in the RD (risk aversion attitude and rank-dependency do not eventually 
change). 
Actually, the significance of the round dummies in the EU model is not necessarily a 
symptom of self-selection, but it can be simply explained by a money offer variation.19 
To control for attrition bias, in unreported analysis, we complete the choice models with 
                                                                                                                                               
2
2χ
2
2χ
H0: γrd + dummy southrd = 1 v/s H1: γrd + dummy southrd < 1; table 6 (2),  = 4.59661 (p-value = 0,1004); table 6 
(3), = 4.34664  (p-value = 0,1138). 
17 H0: γrd + sexrd + dummy northrd = 1 v/s H1: γrd + sexrd + dummy northrd < 1; table 6 (2), 
2
3χ  = 53.93776 (p-value = 
0.0000); table 6 (3), = 46.09243 ( p-value = 0.0000). 23χ
H0: γrd + sexrd + dummy southrd = 1 v/s H1: γrd + sexrd + dummy southrd < 1; table 6 (2), = 91.56767 (p-value = 
0.0000); 
2
3χ
2
3χ  = 66.70482 (p-value = 0.0000). 
18 See tables 5 and 6, specifications 1 and 3, for estimates including only the 5th round dummy. Estimates including 
both of the round dummies are not included and are available from the authors upon request. 
19 In other words, imagine two players, equally risk averse, who have at round n the same box situation; then, if the 
auctioneer makes them two different money offers, it is not unlikely that he offers to one of them more than his 
certainty equivalent, less to the other, such that only the first accepts the offer. This does not mean that the player 
who accepts is more risk averse than the other, and consequently self-selects, but that he has just got an offer which 
has pushed him to accept.  
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a self-selection equation, as it is usually done in a standard panel tobit problem,20 
demonstrating that the assumed selection process does not significantly affect the 
estimated parameters. Nonetheless, we present in the appendix (table 10) the self-
selection equation to show that it does not give any suitable information to understand 
the selection process, since none of the variables seem to affect significantly the 
decision to stay or to quit the game. In the appendix (table 9) we present the self-
selection equation to show that it does not give any suitable information to understand 
the selection process, since none of the variables seems to affect significantly the 
decision to stay or to quit the game. These arguments together with the almost complete 
dominance of the RD fittings over the more parsimonious EU allows us to conclude that 
self-selection is not an issue in our sample, and that the significance of the 4th and 5th 
round dummies in the EU model is simply explained by a misspecification of the 
functional form. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
We use data from 298 showings of the television programme Affari Tuoi, which 
involves players taking decisions between risky prospects with outcomes up to half a 
million euros, to estimate three models of decision making under risk: Expected Utility 
theory, Rank-Dependent Expected Utility and Regret-Rejoice.  
Among the competing choice models considered, the RD model seems always to fit the 
data best. It seems to capture the players’ psychological attitude to overvalue or to 
                                                 
20 J. Heckman (1979). 
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undervalue extreme outcomes. We find instead that the EU model provides a better 
account of players’ choice than the RR model, although the latter is not completely 
discarded as the heterogeneity term highlights that some players actually exhibit regret 
and rejoice behaviour. 
Interestingly, in contrast with the prevailing experimental literature, we find that the 
CARA specification fits our data significantly better than the conventionally-adopted 
CRRA specification. 
We take into account both observed and unobserved heterogeneity in players’ behaviour. 
The latter allows us to obtain not just a point-estimate, but the whole distribution of the 
risk attitude parameter over the population. Unobserved heterogeneity definitely 
improves the fitting both of the risk aversion and of the RD weighting parameters. The 
presence of correlation between unobserved heterogeneity in risk attitude and 
alternatively rank-dependent and regret-rejoice behaviours allows us to identify a 
systematic relationship between these attitudes. 
Observed heterogeneity accounting for gender seems not to matter in the EU choice 
model while it is relevant in the RD. Geographical origin explains part of RD behaviour, 
whereas it only slightly affects risk aversion. 
Overall, the introduction of unobserved heterogeneity reduces significantly the standard 
deviation of the Fechner-noise error term. This means that, after controlling for 
heterogeneity in players’ risk attitude, very few is left to be explained by the error term. 
The estimates of the tremble parameter show that just a small proportion of players 
choose completely at random. Its magnitude is close to 5% in the specification without 
unobserved heterogeneity, but it reduces to 0.3% when unobserved heterogeneity is 
included. 
 20
Finally, we can conclude that individual-specific analyses can be satisfactorily 
substituted by an aggregate approach without losing relevant information about 
individual heterogeneity. 
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Table 1.  Prizes as displayed to players 
€  0.01 €  5,000 
€  0.20 €  10,000 
€  0.50 €  15,000 
€  1 €  20,000 
€  5 €  25,000 
€  10 €  50,000 
€  50 €  75,000 
€  100 €  100,000 
€  250 €  250,000 
€  500 €  500,000 
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 Table 2.  Summary Statistics 
 
 Players Swap Offer Acceptance
Money 
Offer 
Mean Std.Dev. Acceptance
Round 1 298 293 72 5 € 3,200 € 1,351 0 
Round 2 298 9 4 289 € 6,584 € 6,584 4 
Round 3 294 26 12 268 € 7,790 € 7,790 12 
Round 4 284 33 9 251 € 16,388 € 16,388 80 
Round 5 204 95 40 109 € 32,844 € 49,304 54 
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 Table 3.   Parameter estimates; CARA utility functional; maximum 
simulated likelihood (298 groups, 923 obs.) 
 EU RD RR 
Estimates of risk aversion, RD and RR parameters 
α 0.01039 (0.00069) 
0.01119 
(0.00062) 
0.01103 
(0.00151) 
γrd - 0.71734 (0.05553) - 
γrr - - 1.12114 (0.22299) 
Estimates of the covariance matrix, scale parameters and tremble 
raσ  0.00322 (0.00104) 0.00345 (0.00164) 0.00296 (0.00127) 
rdσ  - 0.15134 (0.00076) - 
rrσ  - - 0.17911 (0.02473) 
rdra ,ρ  - 0.65916 (0.03705) - 
rrra ,ρ  - - -0.58947 (0.32492) 
εσ  0.05592 (0.00498) 0.06340 (0.00657) 0.05438 (0.00586) 
ω 0.04586 (0.02008) 
0.03879 
(0.02131) 
0.04871 
(0.02008) 
Log-likelihood -305.05314 -292.21631 -304.37781 
BIC statistics 637.41680 639.05365 663.37767 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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 Table 4.   Parameter estimates; CRRA utility functional; maximum 
simulated likelihood (298 groups, 923 obs.) 
 EU RD RR 
Estimates of the risk aversion, RD and Regret parameters 
α 0.39473 (0.01786) 
0.32205 
(0.11711) 
0.38116 
(0.03019) 
γrd - 0.55655 (0.12788) - 
γrr - - 0.95362 (0.10198) 
Estimates of the covariance matrix, scale parameters and tremble 
raσ  0.06737 (0.01877) 0.08074 (0.07153) 0.07175 (0.01942) 
rdσ  - 0.10690 (0.00147) - 
rrσ  - - 0.11028 (0.09718) 
rdra,ρ  - -0.08896 (0.25915) - 
rrra ,ρ  - - -0.04559 (0.02062) 
εσ  0.02164 (0.00381) 0.01334 (0.00293) 0.02073 (0.00447) 
ω 0.16498 (0.01865) 
0.17387 
(0.02346) 
0.16538 
(0.02164) 
Log-likelihood -365.52249 -355.23462 -364.92457 
BIC statistic 758.35549 765.09027 784.47017 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 5. Parameter estimates; EU; CARA utility functional; 
maximum simulated likelihood (298 groups, 923 obs.) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Estimates of the risk aversion parameter 
α 0.01009 (0.00070) 
0.00835 
(0.00117) 
0.00849 
(0.00183) 
sexra - 0.00131 (0.00140) 
0.00031 
(0.00164) 
Dummy northra - 0.00218 (0.00154) 
0.00227 
(0.00183) 
Dummy Southra - 0.00181 (0.00227) 
0.00183 
(0.00195) 
5th round dummyra 0.02517 (0.00579) - 
0.02468 
(0.00659) 
Estimates of the scale parameters and tremble 
Std.Dev.(uira) 
0.00275 
(0.00095) 
0.00357 
(0.00127) 
0.00298 
(0.00116) 
λ 0.04974 (0.00506) 
0.05466 
(0.00505) 
0.04909 
(0.00510) 
ω 0.07124 (0.02011) 
0.04581 
(0.01934) 
0.07122 
(0.01989) 
Log-likelihood -297.30579 -302.69075 -295.98576 
BIC statistics 628.74972 653.17490 645.79255 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 6. Parameter estimates; RD; CARA utility functional; maximum 
simulated likelihood (298 groups, 923 obs.) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Estimates of the risk aversion parameter 
α 0.01137 (0.00075) 
0.00870 
(0.00125) 
0.00892 
(0.00189) 
sexra - -0.00024 (0.00141) 
-0.00026 
(0.00178) 
Dummy northra - 0.00251 (0.00183) 
0.00230 
(0.00206) 
Dummy southra - 0.00262 (0.00152) 
0.00245 
(0.00190) 
5th round dummyra -0.00361 (0.00332) - 
-0.00044 
(0.00262) 
Estimates of the RD parameter 
γrd 0.76230 (0.10948) 
1.12715 
(0.10275) 
1.11765 
(0.11496) 
sexrd - -0.25624 (0.10469) 
-0.25682 
(0.09874) 
Dummy northrd - -0.33785 (0.10755) 
-0.32537 
(0.12932) 
Dummy Southrd - -0.34809 (0.10783) 
-0.33226 
(0.13515) 
5th round dummyrd -0.24980 (0.31212) - 
-0.04277 
(0.10539) 
Estimates of the covariance matrix, scale parameter and tremble 
raσ  0.00318 (0.00211) 0.00389 (0.00111) 0.00382 (0.00114) 
rdσ  0.13936 (0.01454) 0.06565 (0.00071) 0.06434 (0.00059) 
rdra ,ρ  0.60275 (0.74944) 0.46202 (0.24520) 0.47093 (0.16500) 
εσ  0.06410 (0.00903) 0.05025 (0.00655) 0.05102 (0.00817) 
ω 0.03883 (0.02994) 
0.04453 
(0.01691) 
0.04494 
(0.01710) 
Log-likelihood -291.28109 -283.64643 -283.49393 
BIC statistics 644.01084 656.05204 669.40229 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 7. Descriptions of Variables 
4t h  round dummy dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the decision is taken in the 4th round, 0 otherwise 
5 t h  round dummy dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the decision is taken in the 5th round, 0 otherwise 
Dummy sex dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the player is a male, 0 otherwise 
Dummy north dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the player is from the North of Italy, 0 otherwise 
Dummy south dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the player is from the South of Italy, 0 otherwise 
Average prize dummy variable assuming a constant value equal to the average of the remaining prizes 
Median prize dummy variable assuming a constant value equal to the median of the remaining prizes 
€500,000 box dummy variable equal to 1 if the highest prize figures among the remaining prizes, 0 otherwise  
Players’ box prize dummy variable assuming constant value equal to the content of the player’s box 
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Table 8.   Parameter estimates; CARA utility functional; maximum 
likelihood (923 obs.) 
 EU RD RR 
Estimates of the risk aversion, RD and Regret parameters 
α 0.01080 (0.00052) 
0.01139 
(0.00068) 
0.01184 
(0.00082) 
γrd - 0.67321 (0.05602) - 
γrr - - 1.23824 (0.16661) 
εσ  0.05841 (0.00491) 0.07141 (0.00547) 0.05768 (0.00479) 
ω 0.05192 (0.00033) 
0.04420 
(0.00027) 
0.05461 
(0.00043) 
Log-likelihood -311.24400 -298.20763 -309.57329 
BIC statistics 642.97088 623.72577 646.45709 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 9.  Parameter estimates; CRRA utility functional; maximum 
likelihood (923 obs.) 
 EU RD RR 
Estimates of the risk aversion, RD and Regret parameters 
α 0.40097 (0.02989) 
0.46920 
(0.00068) 
0.01184 
(0.02446) 
γrd  0.69248 (0.07907) - 
γrr - - 0.69248 (0.16661) 
εσ  0.02463 (0.00464) 0.03940 (0.01125) 0.05768 (0.00479) 
ω 0.16859 (0.05373) 
0.12111 
(0.11288) 
0.05461 
(0.03343) 
Log-likelihood -370.06481 -363.01662 -369.77174 
BIC statistics 760.61251 753.34375 766.85399 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 10.   Parameter estimates; selection 
equation; random effect probit 
intercept 18.5844 (587.375) 
Dummy sex 0.05429 (0.41303) 
Dummy north 0.21038 (0.49078) 
Dummy south 0.31424 (0.52816) 
4th round dummy -7.33598 (238.929) 
5th round dummy -15.2228 (471.847) 
Log-likelihood -233.91526 
n.obs. 1490 
n.groups 298 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 11 
RD cumulative weighting functions (wi(p)) for different γi and prizes’ weight distribution by round ( nikπ ) 
Cumulative weighting fct 1st round 2nd round 3rd round 4th round 5th round 
γ
i
=
0
.
5
0
 
γ
j
=
0
.
7
5
 
γ
i
=
1
.
2
5
 
 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
x
w
e
i
g
h
t
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
x
w
e
i
g
h
t
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
x
w
e
i
g
h
t
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
x
w
e
i
g
h
t
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
x
w
e
i
g
h
t
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
x
w
e
i
g
h
t
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
x
w
e
i
g
h
t
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
1 2 3 4 5
x
w
e
i
g
h
t
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
1 2
x
w
e
i
g
h
t
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
1 2
x
w
e
i
g
h
t
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
1 2
x
w
e
i
g
h
t
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
x
w
e
i
g
h
t
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
1 2 3 4 5
x
w
e
i
g
h
t
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
1 2 3 4 5
x
w
e
i
g
h
t
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
x
w
e
i
g
h
t
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
probability
w
e
i
g
h
t
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
probability
w
e
i
g
h
t
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
probability
w
e
i
g
h
t
Note: at each round prizes are sorted in decreasing order 
 
 
Table 12: Likelihood ratio tests 
Competing models Likelihood-ratio test statistic p-value of the test 
Table 3 (RD) v/s table 3 (EU) 25.67906 ( )       0.0000 23χ
Table 3 (RR) v/s table 3 (EU) 1.3507 ( )       0.7171 23χ
Table 4 (RD) v/s table 4 (EU) 20.57574 ( )       0.0001 23χ
Table 4 (RR) v/s table 4 (EU) 1.19584 ( )       0.7540 23χ
Table 5 (1) v/s table 3 (EU) 7.74735 ( )       21χ 0.0054
Table 5 (2) v/s table 3 (EU) 4.72478 ( )       0.1931 23χ
Table 5 (3) v/s table 3 (EU) 15.4947 ( )       0.0038 24χ
Table 5 (3) v/s table 5 (1) 2.64006 ( )       0.4505 23χ
Table 6 (1) v/s table 3 (EU) 21.5441 ( )       0.0006 25χ
Table 6 (2) v/s table 3 (EU) 42.81342 ( )       0.0000 29χ
Table 6 (3) v/s table 3 (EU) 43.11842 ( )      0.0000 211χ
Table 6 (1) v/s table 3 (RD) 1.87044 ( )       0.3925 22χ
Table 6 (2) v/s table 3 (RD) 17.13976 ( )       0.0088 26χ
Table 6 (3) v/s table 3 (RD) 17.44476 ( )       0.0258 28χ
Table 6 (3) v/s table 6 (1) 15.57432 ( )       0.0162 26χ
Table 6 (2) v/s table 6 (3) 0.30500 ( )       0.8586 22χ
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